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Abstract 
We attempt to analyze   the MANET’s routing protocol and improve the security of  viz. the Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) routing protocol. We propose modifications to the AODV protocol used in MANET an algorithm to reduce the Black 
hole attack on the routing protocols in MANETs. Wait time and Request Reply Tab table created to counter the Black hole attacks 
and the AODV protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
Routing in ad hoc networks faces a number of problems like decentralized system, mobile nodes, low infrastructure, 
more power required, medium and limited channel capacity, malicious nodes, causing a significant degradation of 
routing performance. Based on information broadcasted by other nodes routing tables are updated. AODV is a source 
initiated on-demand routing protocol1. In AODV routing data is collected on request, and route is decided depending 
upon queries in the network. 
 
E-mail address: adebarati2303@gmail.com ,b nilesh.marathe@gmail.com,b*leena.ragha @gmail.com 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of scientific committee of International Conference on Advanced Computing Technologies and 
Applications (ICACTA-2015).
565 Debarati Roy Choudhury et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  45 ( 2015 )  564 – 570 
1.  AODV Routing Protocol 
 
(AODV creates and uses two phases (1) Discovery of route and (2) Maintenance of route. Protocol uses Request 
(RREQ)of route, Reply (RREP) of route, Discovery of route and Error of route (RERR) control message in 
Maintenance of route .The beginning node initiates a connection to ending node, first it checks in the existing route 
table, as to whether a fresh route to that destination is available or not . 
 
2. Proposed Algorithm 
 
The solution that we propose here is designed to prevent any alterations in the default operations of either the 
intermediate nodes or that of the destination nodes. The approach we follow, basically only modifies the working of 
the source node, using an additional function pre_ Request Receive Reply (Packet P).Apart from this, we also added 
a new table _RREP _Tab, a timer M_WAIT_TIME that is the total RREP time or half of it and a variable Mali_ node 
to the data structures in the default AODV protocol, as explained further. In the original AODV protocol, by default, 
the source node accepts the first fresh enough RREP request coming to it. As compared, in our approach we store all 
the RREPs in the newly created table viz. RREP _Tab until the time, M_WAIT_TIME. that is the total RREP time or 
half of it. Based on the heuristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
                                                                       Fig.1: Basic Flow-chart for node broadcasting RREQ 
 
We initialize M_WAIT_TIME to be half the value of RREP_WAIT_TIME the time for which source node waits 
solution, the source node after receiving first RREP control message waits for M_WAIT_TIME that is the total RREP 
time or half of it. For this time, the RREP control messages before regenerating RREQ. In our solution, the source 
node after receiving first RREP control message waits for M_WAIT_TIME that is the total RREP time or half of it. 
For this time, the source node will save all the coming RREP control messages in RREP_ Tab table. 
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Fig.2 (a): Algorithm Flow-chart for node broadcasting RREQ                      Fig.2 (b):Flow diagram of AODV handle request 
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3. Main benefits of modifying AODV protocol 
 
The malicious node is identified at the initial stage itself and immediately removed so that it cannot take part in further 
process.  With no delay the malicious node are easily identified for futher  process, i.e. as we said before all the routes 
has unique sequence number. With no delay the malicious node are easily identified i.e. as we said before all the routes 
has unique sequence number4.Once, such malicious node is identified, our solution selects a reply having highest 
destination sequence number from RREP_ Tab table. It does so, by calling our own method viz. the Pre_Receive 
Reply () method.  
 
4. Simulation Environment 
The same connection pattern and mobility model is will be used in simulations to maintain the uniformity across the 
protocols4. 
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5. Simulation details 
The recorded values are obtained by averaging over five runs for each pause time. In the currently simulated 
scenario, we can choose only one node to be the attacker but other simulations may be performed to see the impact 
of having multiple attackers in the network. We collect the following information for each time frame window at 
each node6.                           
                         Table 1. Simulation Parameters                                
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Simulation results and analysis. 
 
To evaluate the packet delivery ratio, End-to-End Delay and Normalized Routing Overhead; simulation is done with 
nodes with the source node transmitting maximum 1000 packets to the destination node. It can be seen from the Fig 
3(a), that PDR of AODV drops by 60.867 % in presence of Black hole attack. The same increases by 60.877 % when 
our solution is used in presence of the attack. At the same time, Fig 3 (b) shows that the rise in throughput is 13.28 %, 
shows the throughput for before and improved is less than after attack. The source node and the destination node of 
Parameter Value 
  
Simulator Ns-2 (ver2.34) all in one 
  
Simulation Time 100 s 
  
Number of nodes/mobile 10,20,30,40 ,50,100 
nodes  
Routing Protocol AODV 
  
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) 
  
Terrain area(Topology) 800m x 800m 
  
Transmission Range 250m 
  
No. of malicious node 1 
  
Data Flow 30% of Nodes 
  
Movement Model Random way point 
  
Packet Size 512 bytes 
  
Channel type Wireless channel 
  
Radio propagation model Two ray ground 
  
Network interface type Wireless physical 
  
Mac type 802.11 
  
Interface queue type Queue/drop tail/Priority queue 
  
Antenna model Omni Antenna 
  
X ,Y dimension 700,700 
  
Maximum Bandwidth 2 Mbps 
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each traffic flow are chosen by using function aodv.tcl randomly. 
 
5.2 Analysis of Metrics used for Simulation 
 
Table 2 :Packet  Delivery  Ratio, Fixed   Sender Table 
 
No of Nodes AODV After  Attack Improved 
    
10-30 9201 937 10534 
20-20 11989 4315 18013 
30-20 14861 10375 18700 
50-30 20181 10411 22403 
100 21123 9000 22504 
 
Table  3 : No of nodes and its   throughput 
 
No of Nodes AODV After  Attack Improved 
10-30 171.34 156.79 156.79 
20-20 211.19 722.04 722.04 
30-20 252.24 1736.08 1736.08 
50-30 328.41 1742.1 1742.1 
100 341.87 1840.83 1840.83 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4: Graph of AODV, after attack, and improved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5: Graph AODV throughput ,after attack and improved 
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6. Conclusion 
 
As compared to the other approaches, we believe the proposed algorithm is simple and efficient and has very less 
delay and congestion in implementation . We successfully analyze that with trivial additional overhead in terms of a 
new MOS _WAIT _TIME variable and a new C mg_ RREP_ Tab table, we are able to counter the Black hole 
attacks on the AODV protocol 
References 
1. Alex Hinds, Stelios Sotiriadis, Nik Bessis, Nick Antonopoulos“Performance Evaluation of Security Algorithms for the AODV MANET    Routing 
Protocol” Third International Conference on Emerging Intelligent Data and Web Technologies, 2012. 
2. H.A. Esmaili, M.R. Khalili Shoja, Hossein gharaee, “Performance Analysis of AODV under Black Hole Attack through Use of OPNET 
Simulator”, World of Science and Information Technology, Vol. 1, No. 2, 49-52 , 2011.  
3. L.Raja1,Dr. S. Santhosh Baboo,”Analysis of Blackhole attacks on AODV Routing Protocol in MANET”, IJCSET ,Vol 2, Issue 12, 1522-1526, 
December 2012. 
4. Patil V.P ” Efficient AODV Routing Protocol for MANET with enhanced packet delivery ratio and minimized end to end delay ”,India 
International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 2, Issue 8, ISSN 2250-3153August 2012 . 
5. Gianni A. Di Caro, Frederick Ducatelle, Luca M. Gambardella. “A simulation study of routing performance in realistic urban scenarios for 
MANETs”. In: Proceedings of ANTS 6thInternational Workshop on Ant Algorithms and Swarm Intelligence, Brussels, Springer, LNCS 5217, 
2008 .  
6.   F. Maan, Y. Abbas, N. Mazharg,” Vulnerability Assessment of AODV and SAODV Routing Protocols Against Network routing Attacks and 
Performance Comparisons” National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), wireless advanced2011.  
7.  K. Lakshmi, S.ManjuPriya, A.Jeevarathinam, K.Rama, K. Thilagam, Lecturer, ”Modified AODV Protocol against Blackhole Attacks in 
MANET“, Coimbatore, International Journal of Engineering and Technology Vol.2 (6), 2010.  
8.  Rajesh J. Nagar, Kajal  S.Patel, “Securing AODV Protocol against Blackhole Attacks ”International Journal of Engineering Research and 
Applications ISSN: 2248-9622 , Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp.1116-1120Jan-Feb 2012.  
9. Jin Taek Kim, Jeong-Ho Kho, Chang-Young Lee, Do-Won Lee, Cheol-Soo Bang, Geuk Lee Dept.of Computer Engineering, Hannam 
University,“A Safe AODV Security Routing Protocol”, Korea International Conference on Convergence and Hybrid Information Technology 
2008.  
10. Mehdi Medadian, Khossro Fardad, “Proposing a Method to Detect Black Hole Attacks in AODV Routing Protocol”, European Journal of 
Scientific Research ISSN 1450-216X Vol.69 No.1, pp.91-101, 2012. 
11.  Sushil Kumar Chamoli, Santosh Kumar, Deepak Singh Rana, “Performance of AODV against Black Hole Attacks in Mobile ad-hoc Networks”, 
International.J.Computer Technology &Applications,Vol 3 (4), 1395-1399, july-august 2012.  
 12. Dr. S. Tamilarasan, “Securing AODV Routing Protocol from Black Hole Attack”, International Journal of Computer    Science      and 
Telecommunications [Volume 3, Issue 7, July 2012]. 
